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THE LIABILITIES OF SURETIES
DANIEL CIPOLLONE*

INTRODUCTION
Guarantees are among the earliest forms of contractual obligations to be recognized
under English law.1 Briefly stated, a guarantee is a promise made by one party (known as
the surety or guarantor) to be answerable for the due performance of some legal obligation
of another party (known as the principal debtor).2 A guarantee may relate to the
performance of an obligation, the discharge of a legal liability, or the payment of an
outstanding debt.3 The Ontario Statute of Frauds states that a guarantee may involve “any
special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of any other person.”4 In
most cases, however, the guaranteed obligation will be in respect of an outstanding debt.
More specifically, the guarantee is an undertaking designed to enhance the protections of a
creditor in the event that a debtor fails to satisfy the payment obligations contained within
the original lending agreement. Put another way, if a debtor defaults, a guarantee functions
to provide the creditor with an alternate source of performance or payment. As a result,
guarantees are among the most common types of security used in contemporary
commercial transactions, and significant sums of money are lent daily in reliance on the
strength of guarantees.5
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of when sureties may be
released from their obligations under a guarantee following a material variation to the
principal lending contract. Part I frames the overall discussion by reviewing the role and
importance of guarantees in contemporary commerce, outlining the central tenets of
guarantee obligations, and distinguishing them as a subset of indemnities. Part II reviews
how sureties have traditionally enjoyed a favoured status at law as well as what, in law, is
considered to constitute a material variation. Part III introduces and sets out a longstanding
rule governing the liability of sureties following a material variation to the principal
contract. Part III examines the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in Manulife Bank
of Canada v Conlin and the Ontario Court of Appeal in Bank of Montreal v Negin and
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Sir William Searle Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 2d ed (London, UK: Methuen, 1914) at 185.
2
Kevin McGuinness, The Law of Guarantee, 3d ed (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc, 2013) at 1
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illustrates how the courts, under similar factual circumstances, arrived at conflicting
outcomes. Part IV goes on to summarize the jurisprudence in Ontario following these
decisions to show that most decisions have distinguished the Supreme Court of Canada’s
judgment in Conlin on the grounds that later guarantees have not been prone to the same
inconsistencies. This argument is bolstered by an in-depth review of the Ontario Court of
Appeal’s recent decision in Royal Bank of Canada v Samson Management & Solutions,
wherein the Court distinguished that case from Conlin and held the surety liable under her
guarantee.
PART I - GUARANTEES: A BACKGROUND
I.I The Role of Guarantees in Contemporary Commerce
The importance of guarantees has not waned despite their longstanding role in
contract law. Historically, banks and creditors would lend not based on collateral but based
on guarantees or endorsements of bills of exchange, typically from the commercial entity or
person that operated the business to which a loan was made.6 By contrast, in instances
where banks and creditors lent on a secured basis, they would only do so in exchange for
hard collateral, often in the form of government bonds or real estate mortgages.7
Today, it is commonly understood that much of the global economy, particularly
the western world, relies on the ready availability of credit. As Walter William Fell
described in 1811,
The universal adoption of a system of credit in all mercantile transactions, and
the prodigious extent to which that system is at present carried, has introduced,
or at least very much increased, the practice of requiring counter securities
against such credit or some other species of guarantee, for the performance of
engagements entered into. The subject of mercantile guarantees may, therefore,
be considered of first consequence both to the commercial world and the
profession of law.8
Given the important role that credit serves in an economy, the laws and regulations that
affect the relationships between creditors, debtors, and other interested parties exert an
important influence on the economic growth and development of a nation or region.
Generally speaking, laws that facilitate the extension of credit will fuel economic
expansion, while those that restrict it will undermine and constrict economic growth. Noted
legal scholar Kevin McGuinness writes that “the law relating to guarantees and other
engagements of a similar nature is one branch of the law which clearly has a significant
6

McGuinness, supra note 2 at 18.
Ibid.
8
Walter William Fell, A Treatise on the Law of Mercantile Guarantees and of Principal and Surety in
General (London: J Butterworth, 1811).
7
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impact upon the rights of creditors and thus the flow of credit.”9 Thus, an analysis of the
law relating to guarantee transactions is relevant from both a legal and economic
perspective. In order to conduct such an analysis, however, it is important to have an
adequate understanding of guarantees and the obligations they engender.
I.II The Nature of Guarantee Obligations
A guarantee is a promise by one person (known as the guarantor or surety) to be
answerable for the due performance of the obligation(s) of another person (known as the
principal or debtor) should the principal fail to perform the obligation as required.10 The
Civil Code of Quebec defines a contract of guarantee, also referred to as a suretyship, as “a
contract by which a person, the surety, binds himself towards the creditor, gratuitously or
for remuneration, to perform the obligation of the debtor if he fails to fulfill it.”11 In a
similar way, the common law defines a contract of guarantee as “a contract whereby one
person (‘the surety’) promises another person (‘the creditor’) to be answerable in the event
of a third person (‘the principal debtor’) making default in respect of a liability incurred or
to be incurred by such third person to the promise.”12 This is distinct from other common
forms of security such as mortgages or pledges because it only provides creditors with a
promise of performance, rather than property, to which a creditor may seek recourse in the
event of a default.
Given that a guarantee is essentially an undertaking to answer for a debt, default, or
miscarriage of another person, it is argued that guarantees possess the quality of an
indemnity. In its most basic sense, an indemnity is a contract by which one party agrees to
indemnify another against loss or damage.13 Despite this similarity, guarantees possess a
defining characteristic that distinguishes them from indemnities, namely their contingent
nature. More specifically, the difference between the two contracts is that in a contract of
guarantee, the surety undertakes a secondary liability to answer for the debtor, who remains
primarily liable. By contrast, in a contract of indemnity, the surety undertakes a primary
liability, either on its own or jointly with the principal debtor.14 In other words, if a person
guarantees the obligations or debt of another person, the creditor will typically look first to
the principal debtor for performance. It is only when the principal debtor has defaulted in its
obligations that the creditor will turn to the surety for performance.15 This difference is

9

McGuinness, supra note 2 at 18.
Ibid at 1.
11
SQ 1991, c 64, s 2333.
12
E Jenks, Jenks’ Digest of English Civil Law, 2d ed (London: Butterworths, 1921) at para 652.
13
McGuinness, supra note 2 at 38-39.
14
Ibid at 3.
15
Ibid.
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aptly described by the following extract quoted by Justice Stratton of the New Brunswick
Court of Appeal in Canadian General Insurance Co v Dubé Ready-Mix Ltd:16
The essential differences are, therefore, that a guarantee gives rise to a
secondary, whereas an indemnity gives rise to a primary obligation and that
there are, therefore, three parties to a guarantee, the creditor, the debtor, and the
guarantor, who promises to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of
another, whereas there are only two parties to an indemnity and if it is a promise
to indemnify a debtor it is owed to the debtor only, and not because he has failed
to perform his obligation, but because he has performed it.
The role of guarantees as a contractual security mechanism and their secondary or
contingent nature in turn give rise to a number of issues. As McGuinness notes, such
questions include:
to what extent must the creditor look primarily to the principal for performance;
must the surety be notified of a default by the principal before an action may be
brought against him; in what way is the liability of the surety affected by
payments made by the principal; must the creditor look to the proprietary
securities provided by the principal before calling upon the surety as a secondary
obligor to perform the guaranteed obligation; what are the rights of the surety in
such proprietary security; and how is the liability of the surety affected by
dealings between the creditor and the principal.17
While each of these issues present unique and challenging questions, this paper focuses on
the last example question, namely how the liability of the surety may be affected by
dealings between the creditor and the principal. To answer this question, it is important to
have an understanding of the legal status of sureties.
PART II - SURETYSHIP AND MATERIAL VARIATIONS
II.I Sureties in the Eyes of the Law
In contrast to the position of a principal debtor, sureties are generally considered
favoured parties in the eyes of the law.18 As McGuinness notes, “courts have from time to
time made reference to this supposed [favoured] status where they wished to prevent
creditors from taking a perceived undue advantage – the liability of the surety thereby being
16

Canadian General Insurance Co v Dube Ready-Mix Ltd, 52 NBR (2d) 66 at 70, [1984] NBJ No 50
(NBCA).
17
McGuinness, supra note 2 at 3.
18
Ibid at 922.

http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/uwojls/vol4/iss2/2

4

Cipollone: The Liabilities of Sureties

trimmed to the level which the court perceived to be acceptable.”19 This approach and
treatment of sureties is undeniably rooted in long-standing policy concerns designed to
ensure that sureties are afforded appropriate protections when facilitating lending
transactions.20 For example, most institutional lenders, franchisors, and other creditors with
significant market power tend to use standard form contracts when accepting guarantees.
These contracts, sometimes referred to as “contracts of adhesion,” limit the ability of
prospective sureties to meaningfully negotiate and underscore the power imbalance that
often exists in the creditor-surety relationship.21 Enhancing this, sureties may be persons of
limited sophistication and commercial expertise. However, the degree to which sureties
may be perceived as favoured in law may also depend on a distinction that exists between
accommodation sureties and compensated sureties.
As Justice McIntyre for the Supreme Court of Canada described in Citadel General
Assurance Company v Johns-Manville Canada, accommodation sureties are those sureties
“who have entered into their contract of surety in the expectation of little or no
remuneration and for the purpose of accommodating others or of assisting others in the
accomplishment of their plans.”22 For instance, credit arrangements among family members
may fall within this category. In respect of such arrangements, the law has taken a more
vigilant approach to protecting accommodation sureties “by strictly construing their
obligations and limiting them to the precise terms of the contract of surety.”23 The practical
implication of this approach is that any doubt or ambiguity in the guarantee is interpreted
against the author of the document, in accordance with the contra proferentem rule.24
Compensated sureties, on the other hand, are often highly sophisticated professional surety
companies, which also tend to have significant experience and interests in the insurance
industry.25 In exchange for guaranteeing performance and payment, these sureties are
compensated through a financial premium.26 On these grounds, compensated sureties are
generally not afforded the same beneficial treatment that accommodation sureties are said to
enjoy. As Justice McIntyre went on to note, “The compensated surety cannot escape the
liability found in the bond merely because of a minor variation in the guaranteed contract or
because of a trivial failure to meet the bond’s conditions.”27
19

Ibid at 376.
Paul M. Perell, “Discharging a Guarantee” (1994) 73 Can Bar Rev 125 [Perell].
21
McGuinness, supra note 2 at 291.
22
Citadel General Assurance Company v Johns-Manville Canada Inc, [1983] 1 SCR 513 at 521 [JohnsManville].
23
Ibid.
24
McGuinness, supra note 2 at 290-291. As McGuinness notes, “The contra proferentem rule is a
principle of construction which holds that the construction that should be placed upon an ambiguous
document is the one which is least favourable to the person who put forward the document. It is one of
the most frequently invoked defences where a claim is made under a guarantee.”
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid at 522.
27
Johns-Manville, supra note 22 at 514.
20

Published by Scholarship@Western, 2014

5

Western Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 4 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 2

With an understanding of the traditional treatment and status of sureties at law and
the distinction that is sometimes drawn between accommodation and compensated sureties,
attention can now turn to instances where a surety may be discharged from his or her
obligations under a guarantee. Though there are a number of instances where this may
occur, this paper is primarily concerned with the extent to which a surety may be discharged
from his or her obligations following a material variation to the principal contract between
the creditor and principal debtor.28 For this purpose, it is necessary to look at what courts
have generally considered to constitute a material variation.
II.II Material Variations Defined
In lending arrangements between creditors and debtors, it is not uncommon for the
creditor to agree to amend the original contract. Such variations may be in respect of the
number of payments, the amount of each payment, the interest rate charged under the
agreement, or the date for repayment of the loan.29 These types of amendments are typically
made once it is apparent to the creditor that the debtor may default or has defaulted under
the agreement. Often, creditors agree to such compromises in an effort to facilitate
repayment of the outstanding debt and to avoid commencing legal proceedings to recover
the debt.30 However, such variations may be considered material and, in some instances,
may relieve a surety from his or her obligations under a guarantee.
In its most fundamental sense, a material variation is said to be “one that alters the
business effect of the relationship, so as to vary the risk.”31 Such variations may be effected
by an express agreement between the creditor and principal debtor or, in the absence of
such an agreement, by a failure to act in accordance with the terms set out in the principal
contract.32 According to McGuinness, a variation is material if it is one that a prudent and
sensible person would take into consideration when entering into an agreement or
transaction.33 In the case of guarantees, variations to the principal contract are often
presumed to be material unless they are clearly unsubstantial or beneficial to the position of
the surety.34 In cases where the effect of the variation is unclear, no inquiry is made into
28

Such instances may include: where a creditor delays in taking action to recover the debt; where there is
an improper or inappropriate dealing with the security; where there is illegality surrounding the contract
of guarantee; where a power of sale is carried out with notice to the surety; or the operation of statutory
provisions. See Joseph E Roach, The Canadian Law of Mortgages, 2d ed (Markham: LexisNexis Canada
Inc, 2010) at 499-500 [Roach].
29
Roach, supra note 28 at 502.
30
Ibid.
31
McGuinness, supra note 2 at 924. As Lord Campbell CJ claimed in Pybus v Gibb (1856), 6 El & Bl 902
at 911, “Where there is a bond of suretyship for an office, and by an act of the parties or by an Act of
Parliament, the nature of the office is so changed that the duties are materially altered, so as to affect the
peril of the sureties, the bond is avoided.”
32
Ibid at 925.
33
Ibid at 924.
34
Ibid.
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whether the variation is material on the facts of the case.35 Rather, if a lack of prejudice is
not self-evident, the surety is relieved of liability.36 While there is an infinite range of
possible variations that may be considered material, a number of contract modifications
have been recognized as material variations. Some examples include repeated renewal of a
loan, an increase in the rate of interest, conversion of a loan into a revolving credit facility,
exceeding a stipulated credit limit under an agreement, and altering the terms of a
guaranteed lease in order to prevent the principal from carrying on the type of business
initially contemplated by the parties.37 With an understanding of what may constitute a
material variation, we can now turn to an analysis of instances when a surety may be
discharged from his or her obligations following a material variation to the principal
contract. A review of jurisprudence in this area is required.
PART III - THE LIABILITY OF SURETIES
III.I The Liability of Sureties Following a Material Variation – The Rule in Holme v
Brunskill
Courts throughout the common law world have questioned the surety’s right to be
discharged from his or her obligations where there has been a material variation to the
principal contract. Generally speaking, the courts have held that any material variation to
the terms of the principal contract made subsequent to the giving of the guarantee without
the consent or approval of the surety will discharge the liability of the surety.38 As Lord
Loughborough stated in Rees v Berrington, “It is clearest and most evident equity not to
carry on a transaction without the knowledge of the surety, who must necessarily have a
concern in every transaction with the principal debtor. You cannot keep him bound and
transact his affairs (for they are as much his as your own) without consulting him.”39 The
terms of this rule were perhaps most notably set out in the case of Holme v Brunskill.40
According to Lord Justice Cotton,
The true rule in my opinion is, that if there is any agreement between the
principals with reference to the contract guaranteed, the surety ought to be
consulted, and that if he has not consented to the alteration, although in cases
where it is without inquiry evident that the alteration is unsubstantial, or that it
cannot be otherwise than beneficial to the surety, the surety may not be
discharged; yet, that if it is not self-evident that the alteration is unsubstantial, or
35

Ibid.
Ibid.
37
Ibid at 929.
38
McGuinness, supra note 2 at 922.
39
Rees v Berrington (1795), 30 ER 765 (Ch).
40
Holme v Brunskill (1878), 3 QBD 495 CA.
36
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one which cannot be prejudicial to the surety, the Court…will hold that in such a
case the surety himself must be the sole judge whether or not he will consent to
remain liable notwithstanding the alteration, and that if the has not consented he
will be discharged.41
The rule in Holme v Brunskill has since been adopted and applied by Canadian
courts. In Rose v Aftenberger,42 Justice Laskin, then with the Ontario Court of Appeal,
reiterated the rule as follows: “In my view, the encompassing principle to be applied is that
a surety is discharged if either the principal contract to which he gave his guarantee is
varied without his consent in a matter . . . not plainly unsubstantial or necessarily beneficial
to the guarantor; or, if the terms of the contract of guarantee between the creditor and the
surety are breached by the creditor.”43
In other words, the relationship of the surety to the creditor and principal debtor is
such that it safeguards the surety’s position from being altered by an agreement between the
creditor and principal debtor from that in which the surety stood at the time of the giving of
the guarantee. However, in the event that a proposed variation may prejudice the position of
the surety, the creditor must seek the consent of the surety in order to preserve the
possibility of recourse to the surety.44 For McGuinness, the consistent judicial interpretation
of this rule has allowed for the scope of such a defence to be defined comprehensively.45 As
he notes, “[I]t has been held . . . that a surety is entitled to a discharge even where the
variation in the contract has not been acted upon.”46 Further, he claims that proof of actual
or certain prejudice to the surety is not required and that a surety may be discharged of his
or her obligations so long as there is a potential for prejudice.47 As one may glean from the
rule in Holme v Brunskill and its subsequent adoption in Canada, the Canadian judicial
system has, consistent with the policy concerns discussed above, taken a vigilant approach
to safeguarding the position of sureties. As a result, sureties have been discharged from
their obligations in a number of instances. Some examples include where a creditor has
allowed the debtor to make payments via installment rather than upon maturity, where a
creditor has agreed to renew the principal contract, where a creditor has stayed the
execution of a judgment without the consent of a surety, and where a creditor has increased
the interest rate in exchange for extending the term of a loan.48 In this way, a surety may be
absolutely discharged if the contract between the creditor and the principal debtor is varied
41

Ibid at 505-506.
Rose v Aftenberger, [1969] OJ No 1496, [1970] 1 OR 547, 9 DLR (3d) 42 (Ont CA).
43
Ibid at para 19. See also Holland-Canada Mortgage Co v Hutchings, [1936] SCR 165 at 172.
44
McGuinness, supra note 2 at 923.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid. See also Pioneer Trust v 220263 Alberta Ltd, [1989] AJ No 56, 42 BLR 266 at 277 (Alta QB).
48
E Jane Murray, “Protecting the Guarantee after it is Signed” (Paper delivered at the 4h Annual
Solicitor’s Conference, County of Carleton Law Association, 1996 [unpublished].
42
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or amended unless “without inquiry it is self-evident that the change is unsubstantial or not
harmful to the surety,” or “the surety has consented to the change.”49 Additionally, given
that the obligations created under a guarantee are of a contractual nature, it is possible for
sureties to contract out of the protections provided by the common law or equity.50 Despite
this, Canadian jurisprudence has inconsistently interpreted such agreements, particularly on
the issue of whether a surety ought to be discharged of his or her obligations. This
discrepancy is particularly evident when one examines the Supreme Court of Canada’s
decision in Manulife Bank of Canada v Conlin and the subsequent decision of the Ontario
Court of Appeal in Bank of Montreal v Negin.
III.II Manulife Bank of Canada v Conlin – The Pinnacle for Sureties
The decision in Conlin marked an important point in the law of guarantee and, more
specifically, the treatment of sureties following a material variation in a principal contract.
As Jeffrey Lem noted in the last sentence of his annotation of Montreal Trust Co of Canada
v Birmingham Lodge Ltd, “Conlin is on its way to the Supreme Court of Canada. The
lending bar waits with bated breath.”51 Although a complete review of the case is set out in
the dissenting opinion of Justice Iacobucci, a brief review of the facts in Conlin is helpful in
this analysis.
The case arose out of a mortgage loan made by Manulife Bank of Canada (the
creditor) to Dina Conlin (the principal debtor) in the amount of $275,000.52 Initially, the
loan was made for a three-year term and bore an annual interest rate of 11.5 per cent.53 Dina
Conlin provided security for the loan in the form of a first mortgage against lands located in
Welland, Ontario.54 In addition, in order to obtain the loan, two guarantees were required as
additional security, one from Dina Conlin’s husband and the other from a limited
company.55 According to the guarantee’s terms, the guarantee was to remain binding
“notwithstanding the giving of time for payment of this mortgage or the varying of the
terms of payment hereof or the rate of interest hereon.”56 Furthermore, the liability of the
sureties was to be continuous, subsisting “until payment in full of the principal sum and all
other moneys hereby secured.”57
In 1990, prior to the maturity of the mortgage, Dina Conlin and the creditor
renewed the mortgage for an additional three-year term at an increased interest rate of 13
49

Perell, supra note 20 at 132.
Bauer v Bank of Montreal, [1980] 2 SCR 102 at 107.
51
Jeffrey Lem, annotation of Montreal Trust Co of Canada v Birmingham Lodge Ltd (1995), 46 RPR
(2d) 153.
52
Manulife Bank of Canada v Conlin, [1996] 3 SCR 415 at para 49 [Conlin].
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid at para 51. For complete excerpts from the guarantee, see paragraph 56 of the decision.
57
Ibid.
50
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per cent per annum.58 Although the renewal form provided spaces for the signatures of both
the registered owner and the sureties, only Dina Conlin signed the agreement.59 Her
husband, from whom she had separated in 1989, was not provided any notice, nor did he
have any knowledge of the mortgage renewal.60 In 1992, Dina Conlin defaulted on the
mortgage, and the creditor sought to recover.61
At trial, the judge found that according to the “clear and unequivocal language” of
clauses 7 and 34 (respecting Renewals or Extensions of Time and Guarantee and
Indemnity, respectively), Conlin’s husband was liable under his guarantee despite the
renewal of the mortgage and the increase in the interest rate.62 However, in a two-to-one
majority ruling, the Ontario Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the trial judge and
released the husband from his obligations under the guarantee.63 Both majority opinions
found that the renewal of the mortgage constituted a material variation of the original
contract, which had the effect of extinguishing the sureties’ liability and could not be saved
by the guarantee and indemnity clauses in the agreements.64 In accordance with the contra
proferentem rule, the court held that the clause was to be construed narrowly against the
creditor.65 Under this approach, the court found that the language in the guarantee clause
did not clearly contemplate the renewal agreement. As a result, the material variation to the
loan, effected through the renewal agreement, released the sureties from their respective
obligations.66 While both majority opinions stressed the notion that the guarantee ought to
be strictly interpreted against the creditor, they also placed particular emphasis on the
favoured treatment traditionally afforded to sureties at law.67 The decision was
subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
In a four-to-three split decision, the Supreme Court of Canada found that the
sureties were released from their obligations upon the renewal of the mortgage loan and
affirmed the notion that a material variation to a principal contract alters the surety’s risk
and extinguishes liability in the absence of consent.68 Writing for the majority, Justice Cory
agreed with McGuinness and held that to allow unilateral variations by “the principal and
creditor would amount to a radical departure from the principles of consensus and voluntary
assumption of duty that form the basis of the law of contract.”69 However, as some have
58

Ibid at para 50.
Ibid at para 53.
60
Ibid.
61
Ibid at para 55.
62
Ibid at para 57.
63
Ibid at para 59.
64
Ibid.
65
Ibid at para 60. It should be noted that the contra proferentem rule was not invoked by Finlayson JA,
but was referred to by Carthy JA in the majority opinions.
66
Ibid.
67
Ibid at paras 58-61.
68
Ibid at para 32.
69
Ibid at para 3.
59
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argued, “the Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment in [Conlin] may represent the high water
mark of judicial indulgence for [sureties] in mortgage proceedings.”70
In rendering the judgment, Justice Cory reiterated the rule in Holme v Brunskill as
follows: “It has long been clear that a [surety] will be released from liability on the
guarantee in circumstances where the creditor and the principal debtor agree to a material
alteration of the terms of the contract of debt without the consent of the [surety].”71 In
addition, Justice Cory affirmed the principle in Bauer v Bank of Montreal that parties may
contract out of the protections traditionally afforded to sureties.72 However, the majority
also drew upon the principle that sureties are “favoured creditors in the eyes of the law
whose obligation should be strictly examined and strictly enforced.”73 While the majority
did not invoke the contra proferentem rule, it agreed with the Ontario Court of Appeal’s
position in Conlin that the language of contracting out provisions must be clear and
construed narrowly.74 On these grounds, the majority held that the language in the
documents did not contain the necessary clarity.
In particular, the majority found a distinction between renewals and extensions of
contract. In reviewing the documents and arrangements at bar, the majority found that the
agreement varying the principal contract was a renewal and not an extension.75 Applying
this to the facts of the case, the majority found that since the guarantee provision failed to
provide for the continuing liability of the surety in the event of a renewal, the surety could
not have contracted out his rights and was thus relieved of his obligations.76 Although the
majority espoused the importance of the contra proferentem rule, it did not resort to it as
Justice Cory held that the clauses in the guarantee “unambiguously [indicated] that the
[surety] was not bound by the renewal.”77
In addition to the strict interpretation of the guarantee provisions, the majority made
two other observations that it considered significant. First, the majority recognized the
distinction between accommodation and compensated sureties, and noted that the sureties
“in this case [came] within the class of accommodation sureties.”78 As the majority went on
to note, “[I]t follows that if there is a doubt or ambiguity as to the construction or meaning
of the clauses binding the [surety] in this case, they must be strictly interpreted and resolved
in favour of the surety.”79 Second, in obiter, the majority commented on the fact that the
renewal agreement contained a signature line for the surety, but that no signature had been
70
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obtained.80 This, as Justice Cory theorized, was a clear indication that the surety was
expected to sign and consent to the renewal.81 Justice Cory went on to note that had a
signature been obtained, this would have been an indication of both notice and consent to
the renewal.
Interestingly, Justice Iacobucci, writing for the dissent, agreed with a number of the
principles outlined by the majority. Most notably, he agreed with the principle set out in
Holme v Brunskill that “any material variation of the terms of a contract between debtor and
creditor, which is prejudicial to the [surety] and which is made without the [surety’s]
consent, will discharge the [surety].”82 As he noted, “[A]n increase in the rate of interest
and an extension of the time for payment are both material changes to the loan agreement
sufficient to discharge a surety.”83 Additionally, Justice Iacobucci recognized that the surety
may waive his or her right to be discharged as a result of a material variation to a principal
contract.84 However, the dissent disagreed with the majority on the interpretation of the
guarantee.
According to Justice Iacobucci, “there is no special rule of construction for
guarantees. Guarantee contracts are basically contracts, like any others, and should be
construed according to the ordinary rules of contractual interpretation.”85 Instead, the
primary rule, as he noted, was that the court should give effect to the intentions of parties as
expressed in their written document.86 While he held that the contra preferentem rule may
be applied where there is ambiguity within a guarantee, he claimed that it is an interpretive
rule of last resort, only to be used when all other means of ascertaining the intentions of
parties have failed.87 Applying this approach to the interpretation of the guarantee, he was
not persuaded by the surety’s argument that a renewal is not the same thing as giving time
for payment.88 Instead, he found that “the plain ordinary meaning of the words, the giving
of time for payment . . . or the varying of the terms of payment [encompassed] the renewal
agreement and, on these grounds, would have held the surety liable under his guarantee.”89
Following the decision in Conlin, there was much controversy and concern in the
lending bar.90 Specifically, lenders, commentators, and lending practitioners worried that
courts would subsequently be less willing to uphold standard form guarantees and material
variations to principal contracts. As Professor Reuben Rosenblatt wrote in response to the
decision:
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Lenders will amend their standard form of guarantee to ensure that the words
“vary, increase or decrease” are used in addition to the words “alter the terms.”
Lenders will make sure that whenever they use the word “successor” they will
also add the word “assigns.” Lenders will amend the standard forms to ensure
that whenever they use the word “extension,” they will add the term
“renewal.”91
While many lenders modified their agreements to reflect such changes in the wake of
Conlin, the effect of the decision has not been as problematic as initially anticipated. As
noted by Gerald Ranking, former chair of Fasken Martineau DuMoulin’s litigation
department in Ontario, “[R]ather than relieving [sureties] of their obligations, Conlin has
become a legal impediment which courts have consistently, if not gracefully, avoided in
order to find in favour of lenders.”92 In fact, “[M]ost decisions since [Conlin] have
distinguished the Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment on the ground that later agreements
have not been prone to the same inconsistencies.”93 A key example of this is the Ontario
Court of Appeal’s decision in Bank of Montreal v Negin.
III.III Bank of Montreal v Negin – A Retreat from Conlin
The Negin decision was delivered less than two months after Conlin. In fact, the
Court reserved its judgment and waited for the reasons of the Supreme Court of Canada
before delivering its final decision.94 The appeal in Negin concerned summary judgments
obtained against both mortgagors and sureties. In particular, the case concerned two
brothers who “each signed a mortgage with the plaintiff bank, and each brother signed the
other's mortgage as a [surety].”95 On appeal, one of the brothers argued that he was
discharged as surety because the plaintiff bank renewed the mortgage without his consent.96
The mortgage was renewed for a period of six months beyond its original maturity date,
while the rate of interest was reduced from 13.5 per cent to 5.75 per cent.97
In dismissing the appeal, Justice McKinlay held that distinct from Conlin, the terms
of the guarantee were unambiguous and that the provisions concerning amendments and
extensions were contained within the guarantee clause.98 Similar to Conlin, the guarantee
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provision contemplated an extension of time, but not a renewal.99 However, Justice
McKinlay did not distinguish between renewals and extensions and instead noted, “[T]he
most compelling words, in my view, are those which state that the liability of the [surety]
‘shall continue and be binding on the [surety], and as well after as before default and after
as before maturity of this mortgage, until the said mortgage moneys are fully paid and
satisfied.’"100 Interestingly, this language bears close resemblance to the guarantee in
Conlin, which included a “continuous liability [that] shall subsist until payment in full of
the principal sum and all other moneys hereby secured.”101 Despite this, Justice McKinlay
went on to summarize, the surety “has covenanted to pay the full amount owing on the
mortgage after as well as before default, and those moneys have not been paid.”102
Additionally, it should be noted that Justice McKinlay claimed that the surety in Negin
could not be classified as an accommodation surety. Rather, as he remarked, “[E]ach
brother guaranteed a mortgage of the other. Each did so knowing that he would be liable on
the mortgage of the other until all amounts owing were paid.”103 Presumably, the fact that
each brother stood as surety for the other in furtherance of the loans represented some
material benefit sufficient to bring them beyond the scope of an accommodation surety.
The reasoning employed by Justice McKinlay appears to resemble that of the
dissent in Conlin, but it is difficult to reconcile the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision with
that of the Supreme Court of Canada. While Peter Devonshire, Professor of Law at the
University of Auckland, notes that “the guarantee clause in Negin strengthened the
creditor’s position to the extent that liability was deemed to continue after maturity,” he
questions “whether in the overall scheme this is a truly substantive difference warranting a
departure from [Conlin].”104 Instead, Devonshire submits that the result in Negin may have
been driven by broader policy concerns, particularly the court’s reluctance to bring into
question the strength of guarantees in commercial arrangements.105 Similarly, Professor
Rosenblatt questions the extent to which these decisions can be reconciled.106 For him, the
main distinguishing factors are that the renewal term was considerably shorter in Negin (six
months instead of three years), and the interest rate was reduced not increased.107 As such, it
could be argued that the material variation of the principal contract in Negin did not produce
a sufficiently adverse impact on the surety’s risk to warrant a complete discharge of the
obligations under the guarantee.
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Despite the undeniable difficulties in trying to reconcile the decisions in Conlin and
Negin, it appears that the reasoning of the majority in Conlin has not persuaded subsequent
decisions of the Ontario Court of Appeal nor those of the lower courts. Many courts have
agreed with Conlin’s statement of the law, namely that: (i) a surety will be released from his
or her obligations under a guarantee where the creditor and principal debtor have agreed to
a material variation of the principal contract without the consent of the surety, and (ii) that a
surety can contract out of the protections afforded by the common law or equity provided
that such language is clear and unambiguous. As in Negin, however, most courts have
distinguished Conlin on the grounds that subsequent guarantees have not been prone to the
same inconsistencies.108 This is particularly evident in the recent judgment of the Ontario
Court of Appeal in Royal Bank of Canada v Samson Management & Solutions.109
III.IV Royal Bank of Canada v Samson Management & Solutions – Continued Retreat
from Conlin
The Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Samson was released on May 13, 2013.
The appeal concerned the enforceability of a standard form bank guarantee.110 The facts of
the case are as follows.
In 2005, Ms. Cusack and her husband, Mr. Brasseur, provided continuing
guarantees for the indebtedness of Mr. Brasseur’s business, Samson, to the Royal Bank of
Canada (“RBC”) for $150,000.111 In 2006, RBC agreed to increase the limit on Samson’s
line of credit to a maximum of $250,000.112 In furtherance of the limit increase, Ms. Cusack
and Mr. Brasseur each provided fresh personal guarantees for $250,000 to RBC.113
Subsequently, the amount covered by the loan agreement was increased on two
occasions—to $500,000 in 2008 and to $750,000 in 2009.114 Although RBC received new
personal guarantees from Mr. Brasseur in respect of each increase, it did not request new
guarantees from Ms. Cusack.115 In 2011, Samson failed, and RBC made demands on Mr.
Brasseur and Ms. Cusack under their personal guarantees, namely his 2009 guarantee and
her 2006 guarantee.116 While the motion judge granted summary judgment to RBC against
Samson and Mr. Brasseur on his personal guarantee, he refused to grant RBC summary
judgment against Ms. Cusack and, instead, granted her summary judgment on her cross108
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motion to dismiss RBC’s action against her.117 Following this, RBC appealed to the Ontario
Court of Appeal and, as Justice Lauwers noted, “[T]here is a single issue in this case . . . .
Did Ms. Cusack contract out of the protection provided to a [surety] by the common law or
equity?”118
Like in other decisions since Negin, the Court of Appeal recognized that the basic
governing law was set out in Conlin.119 In a parallel fashion, the Court of Appeal laid out
the long-standing legal principle in Holme v Brunskill, but also noted that under Conlin a
surety can contract out of the protection provided by the common law or equity.120 In the
end, however, Conlin was distinguished from the facts at bar “as a case not involving a
continuing guarantee, where the wording of the guarantee did not create a prior consent for
subsequent prejudicial actions.”121
In conducting its analysis, the Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that
there had been material variations in the loan arrangements made between RBC and
Samson about which Ms. Cusack had not been consulted and that increased her risk, even
though her financial exposure was capped at $250,000.122 The court noted that these
variations would have discharged Ms. Cusack from liability under the guarantee in the
absence of either her consent or clear language. The court also claimed that the motion
judge erred by failing to interpret the language of the guarantee in order to determine
whether Ms. Cusack had contracted out of her right to be notified of such variations.123
Looking at the guarantee in the context of the transaction as a whole, the court
found that the language of the guarantee was broad and plainly designed to ensure that the
surety contracted out of the ordinary protections afforded under the common law and
equity.124 More specifically, the Court found that certain excerpts from provisions in the
guarantee indicated that Ms. Cusack had contracted out of her right to be notified of any
variations. The excerpts that the Court placed particular emphasis on are as follows.
The first paragraph of the guarantee provided that Ms. Cusack would pay on
demand to RBC “all debts and liabilities, present or future, direct or indirect, absolute or
contingent, mature or not, at any time owing by . . .” Samson to RBC “or remaining unpaid
by the customer to the Bank, heretofore or hereafter incurred or arising and . . . incurred by
or arising from agreement or dealings between the Bank and the customer . . .”125 This
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provision, as the Court noted, “[made] it clear that RBC could increase the amount of its
loan to Samson and Ms. Cusack would remain liable under the guarantee.”126 According to
the Court, this was reinforced by the fact that a letter of independent legal advice,
acknowledged by Ms. Cusack, stated that the guarantee was “for the purpose of securing
the liabilities, whether past, present or future, of Samson.”127 In addition, the Court noted
that the continuing obligation of Ms. Cusack was clearly expressed in clause two, which
provided: “This guarantee shall be a continuing guarantee and shall cover all the liabilities,
and it shall apply to and secure any ultimate balance due or remaining unpaid to the
Bank.”128
Lastly, the Court found that various clauses throughout the guarantee expressly
permitted RBC to take actions that might or would otherwise be material variations
affecting the enforceability of the guarantee at common law or equity, such as extending
time for payment, renewing the loan arrangements, increasing the interest rate, changing the
maturity date of any loan, and introducing new terms and conditions to the borrowing.129
On the basis of the language included in the guarantee, the Court went on to find
that Ms. Cusack had contracted out of the protection provided by the common law and
equity and was therefore liable under the guarantee. According to the Court, “[Ms. Cusack]
knew and accepted that Samson’s indebtedness to RBC could increase in the future even
though her guarantee was limited.”130 While the Court acknowledged that the subsequent
increases in the credit facility were material variations to the principal loan contract, it held
that these variations were contemplated by the parties and permitted under the guarantee.131
Consequently, despite the material variations in the underlying loan arrangements, Ms.
Cusack’s personal guarantee remained enforceable given the clear and unambiguous
language of the guarantee and the factual context.132
The Court of Appeal’s decision in Samson reflects the emphasis courts have placed
on the notion that transacting parties “are entitled to make their own arrangements and
[that] a [surety’s] decision to contract out of the protection provided by the common law or
equity will usually be respected by the courts[.]”133 Furthermore, the decision stands as a
key example of the continuing preference of lower courts to distinguish cases from the
Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling in Conlin. As some lending practitioners have argued,
the decision in Samson is a clear indication that the long-established case law upholding the

126

Ibid.
Ibid.
128
Ibid.
129
Ibid at para 25.
130
Ibid at para 60.
131
Ibid at paras 63-64.
132
Ibid at para 64.
133
Ibid at para 61.
127

Published by Scholarship@Western, 2014

17

Western Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 4 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 2

validity and enforceability of guarantees remains intact.134 Though it may be argued that
Samson involved a continuing guarantee that sufficiently distinguished it from Conlin, it is
arguable that the guarantee in Conlin possessed similar continuing language as evidenced
by the analysis above. Nonetheless, the decision represents the continued commitment of
the courts to promote legal certainty and uphold the validity and enforceability of
guarantees and their role in facilitating the extension of credit. In fact, it should be noted
that the decision in Samson marks the second time in 2013 that the Ontario Court of Appeal
“has enforced the provisions of a ‘plain-vanilla standard form bank guarantee’ in the
context of a business loan.”135 It is also important to note that the Supreme Court of Canada
recently dismissed the leave to appeal application in Samson in November 2013.136 Taken
together, these decisions, combined with those following Conlin and Negin, suggest that in
guarantee transactions courts are, for the most part, reluctant to intervene and afford sureties
the traditionally favoured status that they have enjoyed at law.
Despite the legal certainty promoted by Samson, lenders and lending practitioners
would be well advised to continue to consult and seek the consent of sureties when
contemplating material variations to loan arrangements. As many of these cases, including
Samson, emphasize the language used in the actual guarantee, it is also prudent for lenders
to examine their lending documentation and make any necessary revisions so as to ensure
that “the contracting-out language is clear and unambiguous.”137 As lawyer Stephen
Gillespie remarked in his paper for the Law Society of Upper Canada,
The only foolproof method of ensuring that a surety will be bound by a
guarantee in the face of circumstances that would give rise to a defence is to
obtain the consent of the surety. This should always be done when
circumstances arise which may give rise to a defence, regardless of how
comprehensive the language of the guarantee may be and even if it is not clear
that a defence will be available to the surety.138
That being said, lenders may take some comfort in the fact that the risk of failing to do so
may be somewhat lessened as courts show a clear preference for upholding and enforcing
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well-crafted guarantees. Ultimately, whether the legal certainty espoused by Samson and
similar decisions will continue into the future remains to be seen.
PART IV: CONCLUSION
Guarantees play an important role in facilitating the extension and free flow of
credit in contemporary commerce. In fact, guarantees are among the most common forms
of security used in commercial lending arrangements. Historically, the law has recognized
the unique contingent nature of the liability assumed by sureties and, as a result, has treated
them as favoured parties in lending arrangements. This is particularly true in the event of a
material variation to the principal contract between a creditor and principal debtor. In such
instances, courts have traditionally held that any material variation of the terms of a contract
between the creditor and debtor, which is prejudicial to the surety and is made without the
surety’s consent, will relieve the surety of his or her obligations under the guarantee.
The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed this long-standing principle in Conlin,
where the Court discharged a surety following a material variation to the principal contract
to which the surety had not consented. However, despite this ruling, the Ontario Court of
Appeal in Negin, a case with very similar facts to those in Conlin, held that the guarantee
clearly and unambiguously waived the surety’s rights and protections under the common
law and equity. On these grounds, the Court of Appeal upheld the guarantee and held the
surety liable. Intriguingly, similar to Negin, most Ontario decisions since Conlin have
distinguished the Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment on the grounds that later guarantees
have not been prone to the same inconsistencies. This is particularly true when one
considers the Ontario Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Samson, where the Court
distinguished the case from that in Conlin and held the surety liable under her guarantee.
While it is undeniably difficult to reconcile these decisions, a few conclusions can
be drawn. First, the course of jurisprudence in Ontario makes clear that courts have a
preference for legal certainty in lending arrangements involving guarantees and are
reluctant to intervene where transacting parties have agreed to contract out of the
protections afforded by the common law or equity. Second, the decision in Conlin may
represent the high point of judicial indulgence for sureties in lending arrangements as the
subsequent case law questions the extent to which sureties may still enjoy favoured status at
law. Third, and perhaps most notably, the decisions signal the importance of well-drafted
guarantees. Ultimately, while lenders may take some comfort in the trajectory that
jurisprudence in Ontario has taken since Conlin, it remains to be seen whether this
commitment to legal certainty will be long lasting. As a result, despite the current
preference for courts to respect and uphold guarantees, it remains highly advisable for
lenders to seek out and obtain the consent of sureties when contemplating material
variations to their loan arrangements.
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